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Abstract
Background: The anticipated extent of antiviral use during an influenza pandemic can have
adverse consequences for the development of drug resistance and rationing of limited stockpiles.
The strategic use of drugs is therefore a major public health concern in planning for effective
pandemic responses.
Methods: We employed a mathematical model that includes both sensitive and resistant strains
of a virus with pandemic potential, and applies antiviral drugs for treatment of clinical infections.
Using estimated parameters in the published literature, the model was simulated for various sizes
of stockpiles to evaluate the outcome of different antiviral strategies.
Results: We demonstrated that the emergence of highly transmissible resistant strains has no
significant impact on the use of available stockpiles if treatment is maintained at low levels or the
reproduction number of the sensitive strain is sufficiently high. However, moderate to high
treatment levels can result in a more rapid depletion of stockpiles, leading to run-out, by promoting
wide-spread drug resistance. We applied an antiviral strategy that delays the onset of aggressive
treatment for a certain amount of time after the onset of the outbreak. Our results show that if
high treatment levels are enforced too early during the outbreak, a second wave of infections can
potentially occur with a substantially larger magnitude. However, a timely implementation of wide-
scale treatment can prevent resistance spread in the population, and minimize the final size of the
pandemic.
Conclusion: Our results reveal that conservative treatment levels during the early stages of the
outbreak, followed by a timely increase in the scale of drug-use, will offer an effective strategy to
manage drug resistance in the population and avoid run-out. For a 1918-like strain, the findings
suggest that pandemic plans should consider stockpiling antiviral drugs to cover at least 20% of the
population.
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Background
Future outbreaks of emerging infectious pathogens are vir-
tually certain to occur, and pandemic influenza is one that
seemingly poses a significant threat to human popula-
tions. While the characteristics of the next pandemic strain
remain unknown, the virulence of the currently circulat-
ing avian influenza A virus H5N1 is of great concern [1,2].
Given uncertainties regarding the timing, origin, and viru-
lence of future pandemic strains, as well as the possibility
of an unprecedented spread of the deadly H5N1 virus in
humans, planning strategies for an effective response has
become the top priority of global public health efforts [3-
7].
Pandemic preparedness measures encompass disease sur-
veillance, case identification and treatment, prevention of
community-wide spread of disease, maintenance of essen-
tial services, and research and evaluation [8]. Specific
approaches to influenza infection control include the use
of pharmaceutical products (such as vaccines and antiviral
drugs), and non-pharmaceutical measures (such as per-
sonal protective equipment and social distancing).
Although vaccination remains the most effective strategy
for reducing the risk of infection and subsequent compli-
cations [9], an effective vaccine may not be available for
several months following the declaration of a pandemic.
This highlights the importance of antiviral drugs as the
primary tool for prevention and treatment of infection
[10], especially in light of the insufficient impact that non-
pharmaceutical measures may have on disease mitigation
[11].
Considering that there may be insufficient supply of
drugs, limited production capacity, and a surge in
demand for antiviral therapy with the progression of a
pandemic, the use of antivirals for treatment will likely
take precedence over their preventive (prophylactic) use.
The primary goal in treatment of influenza infection is to
relieve symptoms and limit the severity of infection by
inhibiting virus replication. This will in turn contribute to
the containment of disease spread in the population as a
result of reduced viral transmission. It is therefore imper-
ative to formulate antiviral policies that are most likely to
optimize the health of the greatest number of individuals
in the face of an influenza pandemic.
Although antiviral treatment appears to be crucial in any
pandemic response, the emergence of drug-resistance will
impose significant threats to the effectiveness of drugs
[12-17], and possibly wasteful depletion of stockpiles
without achieving the desired mitigation impact. Previous
modelling studies suggest that, in the ideal situation
where adequate supply of antiviral drugs is secured, con-
servative treatment levels at the early stages of the out-
break, followed by a timely increase in the scale of drug-
use, would preserve the potential for minimizing the final
size of a pandemic while preventing large outbreaks of
drug-resistant infections [18,19]. In this study, we further
investigate the merits of application of antiviral treatment
under the scenario in which the supply of drugs may be
limited and run-out is possible. By employing a mathe-
matical model, we show the relationship between the
drug stockpile and treatment level (the fraction of clinical
infections being treated) for a range of reproduction num-
bers estimated for the past three pandemics [20]. We dis-
cuss the influence of emergence of antiviral resistance for
the use of drugs and demonstrate possible scenarios of
disease outbreaks, including a second wave of infections
in a single outbreak. Our findings extend a previous work
[21], in which emergence and transmission of resistance
are neglected. We also evaluate the impact of an adaptive
antiviral strategy on disease mitigation [18,19], where
aggressive treatment of clinical infections is delayed for a
certain amount of time after the onset of the outbreak.
Finally, we discuss model predictions and their implica-
tions for stockpiling and drug use in pandemic planning.
Methods
We followed a deterministic modelling approach and
divided a population of size S0 (that is entirely susceptible
to the emergent strain) into classes of susceptible (S),
asymptomatically infected (A), symptomatically infected
(I), and removed (recovered/dead) individuals (R).
Infected individuals may undergo an asymptomatic (sub-
clinical) infection for the entire course of disease, without
being diagnosed, and therefore are not treated. A fraction
of those who develop symptomatic (clinical) disease is
treated; this is referred to as the treatment level. We con-
sidered three strains of the pathogen, namely: drug-sensi-
tive, drug-resistant with low transmission fitness (LTF),
and drug-resistant with high transmission fitness (HTF).
The latter initially evolves from further replication and
(compensatory) mutations of resistant strains with LTF
[22]. It is assumed that individuals hosting resistance with
LTF make no contribution to the spread of resistant
viruses [23-25]. In the model presented here, the number
of resistant infections increases through (i) development
of drug-resistance during treatment of sensitive infections,
and (ii) direct transmission of resistant strains with HTF.
We assumed that the treatment has no effect in reducing
the level of infectiousness in resistant infections
[16,26,27]. Furthermore, it is assumed that infection
caused by sensitive or resistant strains results in genera-
tion of immunity against all pathogen strains upon recov-
ery. The transitions between classes of individuals are
schematically represented in Figure 1 [see additional file
1].
Reproduction numbers
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of various antiviral
strategies, we calculated the control reproduction numberBMC Infectious Diseases 2009, 9:8 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/9/8
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as   [see additional file 1], where 
represents the effective reproduction number of the sensi-
tive strain when treatment is applied, and   is the repro-
duction number of the resistant strain with HTF for which
treatment is ineffective. The expressions for these quanti-
ties are given by
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Model structure Figure 1
Model structure. Model diagram for the progression of disease and development of drug-resistance during treatment of 
infected individuals.
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Table 1: Model parameters and estimations
parameter description baseline value references
1/ A mean infectious period of asymptomatic infection 4.1 days [3,6,7]
1/ U mean infectious period of untreated symptomatic infection 4.1 days [3,6,7]
1/ T mean infectious period of treated symptomatic infection 4.1 days [3,6,7]
dU death rate of untreated symptomatic infection 0.002 day-1 [12,19]
dT death rate of treated symptomatic infection 0.001 day-1 [12,19]
dU,r death rate of resistant infection (low fitness) 0.0002 day-1 [12,19]
dr,U death rate of resistant infection (high fitness) 0.0008 day-1 [12,19]
 A relative transmissibility of asymptomatic infection 0.142 [6,7,19]
 T relative transmissibility of treated symptomatic infection 0.4 [3,12,19]
 r relative transmissibility of resistant strain (high fitness) 0.9 [19,27]
p probability of developing clinical symptoms 0.67 [6,7]
rate of emergence of de novo resistance 0.018 day-1 [19,25]
rate of conversion between resistant mutants 0.0036 day-1 [19,25]
q treatment level variable
Description of the model parameters with their values obtained from the published literature.BMC Infectious Diseases 2009, 9:8 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/9/8
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where   is the baseline transmission rate of the sensitive
strain; and description of other parameters with their esti-
mates are given in Table 1. In the absence of treatment (q
= 0), Rc reduces to the basic reproduction number of the
sensitive strain given by
In single-strain epidemic models, these reproduction
numbers can be used to determine the final size of the
outbreak [28]. However, the final size relation for multi-
strain models, such as the one considered in this study,
may be difficult to obtain. If only resistant strains with LTF
are present, then the final size of the pandemic can be
expressed in terms of the control reproduction number of
the sensitive strain,   [see additional file 1].
Results
We considered various scenarios of disease outbreak in
the presence of antiviral treatment, when the reproduc-
tion number of the sensitive strain (R0), the treatment
level of clinical cases, and the size of drug stockpile vary in
their respective ranges. Due to the unknown transmissi-
bility of the pandemic strain, we used reproduction num-
bers estimated for pandemics of the last century, ranging
from 1.5 to 2.5 [20,29]. We simulated the model by intro-
ducing a single case infected with the sensitive strain into
a susceptible population of size S0. The rate of de novo
resistance ( ) that generates mutants with LTF is reported
to range from 0.018 to 0.072 day-1  [19,25], and we
assumed a baseline value of   = 0.0018 day-1, which results
in the emergence of drug-resistance in approximately
6.8% of treated patients in our model. The rate at which
treated individuals (hosting resistant viruses with LTF)
develop resistance with HTF (90% relative to that of the
sensitive strain) is assumed to be 5-fold smaller, taking the
baseline value of   = 0.0036 day-1 [19]. These rates contrib-
ute to an overall 0.1% incidence of resistance with HTF
(without considering direct transmission) in our model.
Other parameter values used in simulations are given in
Table 1.
Adequate supply
We simulated the model by considering a constant treat-
ment level throughout the outbreak. Assuming R0 = 1.5
(  = 1.35), Figure 2a shows the required amount of anti-
viral courses (relative to the initial size of the population
S0) as a function of the treatment level of clinical infec-
tions. As is evident, in the absence of antiviral resistance (
= 0), the required stockpile increases as the treatment rises
to moderate levels, and decreases for higher treatment lev-
els due to a significant reduction in the spread of the sen-
sitive infection and possible containment of the disease in
the population (Figure 2c, solid curve); this is consistent
with the results of a previous work [21]. For the scenario
considered here, the reproduction number   = 1.5
(without treatment) reduces to 1.33 and 1.15 at (low)
20% and (moderate) 40% treatment levels, respectively;
and falls below one (  = 0.97) as treatment level further
increases to 60%, which results in disease containment.
However, in the presence of resistance with HTF, the
required stockpile will substantially increase for higher
treatment levels (Figure 2a, dashed curve), since drug-
resistance spreads widely in the population (Figure 2c,
dashed curve), resulting in a large number of resistant
clinical cases that may receive treatment. This indicates
that the supply of antiviral drugs is rapidly depleted, and
run-out is more likely to occur should transmissible resist-
ance emerge during the outbreak. Further simulations
confirm that these results remain valid for higher values of
R0, as shown in Figure 2b, d for a particular value R0 =
2.5(  = 2.25). Figures 2c–d show the corresponding sce-
narios for the ratio of the total number of clinical cases as
a function of the treatment level. Dashed curves show
that, if treatment levels are maintained constant, there is
an optimal level for minimizing the final size of the epi-
demic, above which outbreaks with larger magnitudes can
occur. The increase in the total number of clinical infec-
tions for high treatment levels is consistent with previous
observations [19,27], as a direct consequence of emer-
gence of resistant mutants with HTF. We tested the robust-
ness of these results by performing a sensitivity analysis
over a wide range of key parameters, including the basic
reproduction number, the rate of de novo resistance emer-
gence, the rate of conversion between resistant mutants,
the probability of developing clinical disease, and the rel-
ative transmissibility of the resistant strain with HTF [see
additional file 1]. This analysis demonstrates that (i) inter-
mediate levels of treatment (corresponding to the optimal
treatment levels for various samples of parameters) lead
to the minimum in the total number of infections; and
(ii) a substantially larger stockpile is required when treat-
ment exceeds the optimal level in a constant treatment
strategy.
To explore the effect of transmissibility of the pandemic
strain on the use of antiviral drugs, we simulated the
model for the required antiviral courses (relative to S0) as
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a function of R0, when a constant treatment strategy is
implemented [19,27]. Figures 3a–c show the size of stock-
pile required for 20%, 40%, and 60% treatment levels,
when resistance is absent (  = 0, solid curves) and present
(dashed curves). Clearly, a larger stockpile is needed for
higher R0, especially when resistant mutants with HTF
spread in the population. For a low treatment level (20%),
the profiles of antiviral courses are virtually identical in
both scenarios, as the prevalence of resistance is negligi-
ble. For a moderate treatment level (40%), the resistant
strain with HTF will gain a competitive advantage for low
values of R0, which requires a significantly larger stockpile
compared to the scenario in which resistance is absent
(Figure 3b). However, as R0 increases, the selective advan-
tage of the resistant strain is largely overturned by the high
transmissibility of the sensitive strain, and therefore com-
parable levels of stockpile are required. When treatment is
maintained at a higher level (60%), the spread of the sen-
sitive strain is substantially reduced, thereby providing an
opportunity for the resistant strain with HTF to out-com-
pete the sensitive strain over available susceptible hosts.
Figure 3c shows that, in this case, a significantly larger
stockpile is required, which will be largely dispensed for
treatment of resistant infections for which it has no effect.
The corresponding scenarios for the ratio of the total
number of clinical infections as a function of R0 are illus-
trated in Figures 3d–f, which corroborate previous find-
ings regarding the wide-spread of antiviral resistance with
high treatment levels [18,19,27].
Required antiviral stockpile and ratio of the total clinical infections Figure 2
Required antiviral stockpile and ratio of the total clinical infections. Required stockpile of antiviral drugs (relative to 
S0) as a function of the treatment level for (a) R0 = 1.5; and (b) R0 = 2.5. Ratio of the total number of clinical infections to S0 as 
a function of the treatment level for: (c) R0 = 1.5; and (d) R0 = 2.5. Solid curves correspond to the case where resistance is 
absent, and dashed curves represent the scenario in which resistant viruses with HTF are present.
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Inadequate supply
Assuming that the supply of antiviral courses suffices to
treat 12% of the population, we simulated the model for
the range of R0 between 1.5 and 2.5, with different treat-
ment levels. The initial drug supply (12%) amounts to
approximately 50% of the targeted size of stockpiles in
several national pandemic plans [5,30,31]. In our simula-
tions, we assumed that q = 0 when the initial drug supply
is entirely dispensed during the outbreak. For a low treat-
ment level (20%), although the disease cannot be con-
tained, drug resistance is unlikely to invade the
population and the initial supply would suffice for the
duration of the outbreak (Figure 4a). As treatment
increases to moderate levels, the supply of drugs is more
rapidly depleted and fully dispensed for high values of R0.
Figure 4b shows this scenario for a 40% treatment level,
with the occurrence of run-out for smaller R0 when resist-
ant mutants with HTF are present (dashed curve). We
observed similar results for higher treatment levels with
run-out for the entire range of R0 in the presence of trans-
missible resistance, due to a large number of clinical
resistant infections. However, disease containment may
be achieved for low values of R0 when resistance is absent,
as illustrated in Figure 4c (solid curve) for a 60% treat-
ment level. These simulations indicate that the emergence
of resistance has very little impact on the use of antiviral
drugs if treatment is maintained at low levels or the basic
reproduction number is sufficiently high. The correspond-
ing ratios of the total clinical infections to S0 are shown in
Figures 4d–f, which highlight the impact of drug resist-
ance on antiviral use with limited stockpile.
Unlimited supply of antiviral drugs Figure 3
Unlimited supply of antiviral drugs. Required stockpile of antiviral drugs (relative to S0) as a function of R0 with a constant 
treatment level of: (a) 20%; (b) 40%; and (c) 60%. Ratio of the total number of clinical infections to S0 as a function of R0 with a 
constant treatment level of: (d) 20%; (e) 40%; and (f) 60%. Solid curves correspond to the case where resistance is absent, and 
dashed curves represent the scenario in which resistant viruses with HTF are present.
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Adaptive treatment strategy
Since emergence of resistant mutants with HTF can poten-
tially result in a rapid depletion of drug stockpiles, man-
agement of drug resistance in the population is crucial for
the success of any antiviral strategy, in particular when
supplies are limited. A recent evaluation of antiviral strat-
egies suggests that, if a pandemic virus is not contained at
the source, delaying aggressive treatment can substantially
reduce the likelihood of emergence and population-wide
spread of resistance [19]. Not only can this adaptive strat-
egy prevent large outbreaks of drug-resistant infections,
but it can also minimize the overall pandemic burden if
followed by a timely increase in the scale of drug-use.
Here we investigate the effectiveness of an adaptive antivi-
ral treatment as a function of drug stockpile, when the ini-
tial treatment level changes at time t* during the outbreak.
Assuming R0 = 2 (  = 1.8), Figure 5a shows the ratio of
the total number of clinical infections to S0 in the absence
of transmissible resistance, when the initial treatment
level 0% increases to 80% at time t* displayed on the ver-
tical axis. In this case, an earlier increase in the treatment
level results in a lower number of clinical cases. The region
for run-out is delimited by the solid curve, contains the
origin, and shrinks as the stockpile increases. In the pres-
ence of resistant mutants with HTF, the region for run-out
extends to larger stockpiles (Figure 5b, below the solid
curve). However, the delay in start of intensive treatment
becomes crucial to manage resistance and reduce the total
number of infections, particularly when adequate supply
R
r
0
Limited supply of antiviral drugs Figure 4
Limited supply of antiviral drugs. Antiviral use of an initial 12% stockpile (relative to S0) as a function of R0 with a constant 
treatment level of: (a) 20%; (b) 40%; and (c) 60%. Ratio of the total number of clinical infections to S0 as a function of R0 with a 
constant treatment level of: (d) 20%; (e) 40%; and (f) 60%. Solid curves correspond to the case where resistance is absent, and 
dashed curves represent the scenario in which resistant viruses with HTF are present.
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of drugs is secured. We observed similar results for an ini-
tial 25% treatment level with an extended region for run-
out due to higher scale of drug-use (Figures 5c–d). While
highlighting the importance of management of drug-
resistance in the population, these simulations indicate
that for small stockpiles, adaptive antiviral strategy has no
significant benefits over a constant treatment policy.
In order to evaluate the effect of t* and the size of stock-
pile on disease mitigation, we further simulated the
model for the time course of infections with an initial
25% treatment level. Figure 6a shows the profiles of the
clinical infections caused by all strains (solid curve) and
resistant infections (dashed curve) with a stockpile of size
8.5% (relative to S0), when treatment increases to 80% at
day 40 after the onset of outbreak. As is evident, run-out
appears before resistance can widely spread, and a second
wave of infections occurs due to a large number of sensi-
tive infections. An increase in the drug supply, and there-
fore antiviral use, leads to the further reduction in the
spread of the sensitive infection, and the effect of resist-
ance becomes more pronounced in the occurrence of the
subsequent outbreak, as depicted in Figure 6b for 12%
stockpile. We also observed this phenomenon for ade-
quate supply of drugs (Figure 6c); however, the subse-
Final size of infections with adaptive treatment strategy Figure 5
Final size of infections with adaptive treatment strategy. The effect of changing treatment level during the outbreak on 
the total number of clinical infections caused by all strains, with various sizes of stockpile and R0 = 2. Simulations were seeded 
with an initial treatment level of: (a) 0% without resistance; (b) 0% with resistance; (c) 25% without resistance; (d) 25% with 
resistance, and then changed to 80% at the time displayed on the vertical axis (corresponding to the time-course of the out-
break). The color bars illustrate the ratio of the total number of clinical infection to S0 due to all strains. Run-out occurs in the 
regions consisting of the origin and delimited by the solid curves.
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Time-courses of the outbreak with adaptive treatment strategy Figure 6
Time-courses of the outbreak with adaptive treatment strategy. The effect of changing treatment level during the 
outbreak on the time course of clinical infections with R0 = 2. Simulations were seeded with an initial treatment level 25%, and 
then changed to 80% at: (a) day 40 with stockpile of size 8.5% (relative to S0); (b) day 40 with stockpile of size 12% (relative to 
S0); (c) day 40 with adequate drug supply; (d) day 50 with adequate drug supply. Solid curves show the time courses for the 
ratio of the clinical infections to S0 caused by all strains, and dashed curves represent those of only resistant infections.
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quent wave of infections is largely caused by wide-spread
drug-resistance. Compared with simulations illustrated in
Figure 5d, it can be seen that although the stockpile is not
confined, the early onset of aggressive treatment may
result in a large resistant outbreak. With adequate quanti-
ties of antiviral courses and t* = 50 as the optimal time for
raising the treatment level to 80% (Figure 5d), both emer-
gence of resistance and the occurrence of a second wave of
infections are prevented, while the final size of the pan-
demic is also minimized (Figure 6d). We also performed
a sensitivity analysis to evaluate the effect of parameters
variation on the optimal time t* at which treatment level
changes as a function of the reproduction number, in
order to minimize the final size of the pandemic [see
additional file 1]. Whether the stockpile is limited or not,
the results show qualitatively similar patterns, and dem-
onstrate that aggressive treatment should be implemented
with shorter delay as the basic reproduction number
increases. However, the effect of initial treatment level
becomes much more pronounced on the optimal time t*,
with significantly longer delay for higher initial treatment
levels as the reproduction number decreases.
Discussion
As nations prepare to confront the next influenza pan-
demic, disease mitigation strategies are being carefully
gauged to project the effectiveness of preventive, thera-
peutic, and social distancing measures. Published model-
ling studies suggest that the pandemic can be contained at
the source if early treatment of diagnosed cases is com-
bined with targeted blanket prophylaxis and social dis-
tancing measures [3,7]. Significant assumptions are
embedded in the core of such models, most of which are
unlikely to be fulfilled in a real world environment, and
therefore containment failure should be anticipated when
devising effective preparedness countermeasures.
While application of antiviral drugs has been rationalized
as the first-line defence against a pandemic, public health
authorities are concerned with the strategic use of drug
supply in order to maximize both short-term population-
wide benefits and long-term epidemiological effects of
antiviral therapy. In this study, we developed a mathemat-
ical model to assess the impact of various antiviral strate-
gies on curtailing disease, by considering the interplay
between three confounding factors: (i) the treatment level
of clinical infections; (ii) the emergence and spread of
antiviral resistance; and (iii) the size of the stockpile. In
the absence of resistance, we have shown that an intensive
treatment early on during the outbreak minimizes the
overall disease burden regardless of the size of the stock-
pile. In this case, if R0 is not too high, containment of the
disease may be achieved with sufficiently high level of
treatment. This strategy is particularly beneficial when
stockpile is limited, since it significantly reduces the
spread of disease in the population, and therefore requires
fewer courses of antiviral drugs.
Our results suggest a significantly different strategy for
antiviral use if resistance were to develop with a transmis-
sion fitness comparable to that of the sensitive strain. As
indicated by simulations (Figures 3, 4), emergence of
drug-resistance has no considerable impact on the use of
drugs, and therefore on the depletion of stockpiles, if
treatment is maintained at low levels throughout the out-
break, or R0 is sufficiently high. However, for moderate to
high treatment levels, the spread of resistance leads to a
more rapid consumption of available stockpiles, and run-
out is likely to occur even for low values of R0 (Figure 4b–
c). For comparison purposes, we applied an adaptive anti-
viral strategy that has been thoroughly evaluated in previ-
ous work [19], and observed that delaying aggressive
treatment can potentially eliminate the possibility of
wide-spread drug resistance, and also minimize the final
size of the outbreak. This strategy allows for the initial
prevalence of the drug-sensitive strain under low pressure
of drugs to deplete a sizable portion of susceptible hosts
[18], and therefore prevents the outgrowth of resistance
when selection occurs. However, a timely increase in the
scale of drug use plays a critical role in the success of this
adaptive treatment policy. We demonstrated that, if high
treatment levels are implemented too early during the
outbreak, a second peak of infections can occur due to
run-out with limited stockpile, or as a result of popula-
tion-wide spread of resistance (Figure 6a–c).
A comparative evaluation of antiviral use indicates that
the overall healthcare benefits of an adaptive strategy may
be much higher than a constant treatment policy. Assum-
ing R0 = 2, the adaptive strategy with an initial 0% treat-
ment level (increased to 80% at time t* = 35) requires a
stockpile of size 18.5% (relative to S0), and results in 24%
reduction in the total number of clinical infections com-
pared with the constant antiviral treatment at the optimal
level 41%, which requires a stockpile of size 17.5%. We
observed a similar outcome of the adaptive strategy with
25% initial treatment level (increased to 80% at time t* =
50) and 19% stockpile, leading to 22% reduction in the
total number of clinical infections compared with the
constant treatment at the optimal level. While the adap-
tive treatment policy places a demand for slightly larger
stockpiles, its increased financial burden must be
weighted against the inevitably far greater cost savings that
would be obtained through substantial reduction in mor-
bidity and therefore hospitalizations during the pan-
demic.
For a novel influenza strain with the reproduction
number similar to that of the 1918 pandemic [20,29], the
findings suggest that in order to reduce the risk of a subse-BMC Infectious Diseases 2009, 9:8 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/9/8
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quent wave of infections within an adaptive treatment
strategy, pandemic plans should consider stockpiling
antiviral drugs with a minimum capacity of 20% (relative
to the population size). Given that drugs may also be used
for pre-exposure prophylaxis of front-line healthcare
workers and emergency responders, and considering that
prophylaxis makes a greater contribution to the spread of
resistance [25], much larger stockpiles would be required
to avoid run-out. It is, however, suggested that allocating
different drugs for treatment and prophylaxis may con-
strain resistance development in the population, and
therefore reduce the use of antiviral courses [32].
Our efforts in this study are based on simulating a com-
partmental epidemic model using parameters estimated
in the published literature that involve some degree of
uncertainty, particularly with regard to the duration of
asymptomatic infection and the effectiveness of antiviral
treatment. For the impact of antivirals, we assumed a 60%
reduction in absolute infectiousness from the start of
treatment, which is consistent with a recent meta-analysis
of antiviral effects on secondary attack rates observed in
household studies [33]. Since exposed individuals cannot
transmit the disease during the short period of latency, we
simplified the model to exclude the classes of exposed
individuals. Furthermore, treatment of infected individu-
als is not feasible until after the latent period has elapsed
and may be initiated upon diagnosis during symptomatic
infection. Although the inclusion of these classes and
delay in start of treatment more realistically represents the
epidemiology of disease [19], the results are expected to
alter quantitatively. While emphasizing the qualitative
aspects of the results, we understand that this modelling
approach is subjected to several limitations, particularly
with regard to heterogeneity in population interactions
and stochastic effects at the early stages of an outbreak.
There is also much uncertainty about the parameters gov-
erning resistance in vivo [14], and how a novel influenza
strain would affect different populations with distinctly
different mobility patterns [34]. Nonetheless, combined
with the previous work on strategic use of drugs for reduc-
ing the likelihood of resistance emergence [19], our
results suggest that prolonging the effectiveness of antivi-
ral drugs would need to be considered in practical imple-
mentation of treatment strategies, especially with the
expected delay in availability of a strain-specific vaccine.
We should point out that in our model, there is no param-
eter quantifying the detection of the outbreak. However,
in the case of pandemic influenza, the previous threshold
used for identification of seasonal outbreaks when ~1 –
5% of the population has been infected seems unrealisti-
cally high [35], especially in light of the ongoing surveil-
lance and also recent experience with SARS and other
emerging infectious diseases. Furthermore, given the
uncertainty of parameter estimation, the timing results of
this work should not be interpreted quantitatively, but
rather as a general principle for antiviral strategies that
delaying the onset of wide-scale treatment can potentially
reduce the overall disease burden while preventing large
resistant outbreaks.
Conclusion
Our simulations show that a second wave of infections
can occur due to the emergence of highly transmissible
resistance or as a result of run-out under the scenario of
limited antiviral stockpile. The results demonstrate that
conservative treatment levels during the early stages of the
outbreak, followed by a timely increase in the scale of
drug-use, can minimize the likelihood of both resistance
emergence and run-out. The findings suggest that, for a
1918-like influenza virus, pandemic plans should con-
sider stockpiling antiviral drugs for treatment of at least
20% of the population.
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